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The Relationship Between GATT
And The United Nations
PETER NEUMANN*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article has a twofold purpose. The immediate aim is to explain
and define the relationship between the United Nations and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,' commonly known as GATT. It is a
further goal to contribute to an understanding of why the developments
on the legal plane took place as they did and to facilitate an understand-
ing of the interplay between international politics and international
law2 by making available a rather minute study of a well defined ques-
tion with wide implications.
This task necessitates an analysis of the establishment, development
and present legal status of the General Agreement, of the Charter for the
International Trade Organization,3 and of the Interim Commission of
the International Trade Organization.4
The two bodies which did come into existence, the General Agreement
and the Interim Commission, have a common origin in resolutions of
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and, in addition, share
largely identical purposes which are stated in general terms in Article 55
of the United Nations Charter and more specifically in the General
*Assistant Legal Officer, General Legal Division, United Nations Secretariat. The
article represents the personal views of the author and not necessarily those of the
United Nations. The author wishes to acknowledge the encouragement and assistance
received from Hannah J. Zawadzka Neumann.
1. For text of the original agreement, hereinafter referred to as the General Agree-
ment, see Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Geneva, Switzerland,
1947.
2. See Hoffmann, The Study of International Law and the Theory of International
Relations, 1963 PROC. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 26.
3. Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment, Havana, Cuba, 1948, also known as the Havana Charter.
4. Hereinafter referred to as the Interim Commission.
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Agreement and the resolution establishing the Interim Commission. A
closer analysis, however, reveals a number of features which, despite the
intimate working relations between the two, confirms that the General
Agreement and the Interim Commission are legally distinct bodies. They
are, moreover, not organs of the United Nations.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 18, 1946, ECOSOC passed a resolution 5 for the calling of
an International Conference on Trade and Employment. In accordance
with the resolution, ECOSOC appointed Members to a Preparatory Com-
mittee and defined its mandate. With the exception of the Soviet Union
which declined to attend, all Members appointed to the Preparatory
Committee met and participated in the Committee's work. The reason
given by the Soviet Union for its abstention was that it "had not found
it possible to devote sufficient preliminary study to the important qtes-
tions which were the subject of the Committee's discussion." 0 This rea-
son appears more readily understandable in view of the fact that the
Soviet Union was the only country with a centrally planned economy
among the 19 Members of the Preparatory Committee.
The Preparatory Committee, on April 19, 1947, at its second session in
Geneva, initated negotiations directed to the substantial reduction of
tariffs and other trade barriers and to the elimination of preferences on
a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis. The negotiations resulted
in the framing of a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and of a
Protocol of Provisional Application.7
The decision to negotiate the General Agreement within the Prep-
aratory Committee was taken by the Committee itself in a resolution
adopted at the end of the first session.8 The preamble to that resr ition is
of considerable interest in three respects: (1) it interprets the terms of
reference laid down by ECOSOC in a manner which might be -omewhat
difficult to reconcile with the words of the resolution; (2) it i. Lorms us
that the Governments attending the first session had received and ac-
cepted an offer from the United States Government to "negotiate con-
crete arrangements for the relaxation of tariffs and trade barriers of all
kinds;" and (3) it states as the position of the Preparatory Committee
5. 1 U.N. ECOSOC, Res. 1/13.
6. 5 U.N. ECOSOC, Official Records, Annex 8, U.N. Doc. E/469, Interim report of
the second session of the Preparatory Committee (1947).
7. Quoted from the preamble of the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the
second session of the Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Employment, 1947.
8. Report of the first session of the Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conference
on Trade and Employment, Annex 7 (1946).
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that the planned Conference on Trade and Employment would be facili-
tated if concrete action were taken by the principal trading nations to
enter into mutually advantageous negotiations directed to the substan-
tial reduction of tariffs and to the elimination of preferences.
It appears that the essence of the mandate of the Preparatory Com-
mittee9 was "to elaborate an annotated draft agenda including a draft
convention." The mandate further directed the Preparatory Committee
to take into account as a basis of discussion that the agenda should in-
clude a certain number of topics which were specified in the resolutions
contained in paragraph 3.10 It would therefore seem that the Members of
the Preparatory Committee made a very broad interpretation of the man-
date given to them by ECOSOC when they negotiated and signed the
General Agreement. Although it may be maintained that the General
Agreement covers the same issues as were suggested for inclusion in the
agenda for the Conference on Trade and Employment, it might be argued
from a textual analysis that these issues were only "suggested" to the
Preparatory Committee as a basis for discussion; they were to be "taken
into account" when the Preparatory Committee elaborated "an anno-
tated draft agenda including a draft convention." As a further argu-
ment, it may be mentioned that the objective of establishing an inter-
national trade organization as a specialized agency of the United Na-
tions was widely supported.
From a purely practical point of view, the assumption that the success
of the Trade and Employment Conference would be facilitated if the
18 Governments attending the meetings of the Preparatory Committee
first negotiated and concluded agreements among themselves on trade
liberalization may be easily accepted. However, it would then seem de-
sirable that provisions be made so that the interests of the unrepre-
sented States would not be impaired.
One of the keys to understanding the unique character of the General
Agreement is the provision for joint action by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES in Article XXV.1" Areas for joint action do not, however, in-
9. See note 5 supra.
10. Although the ECOSOC resolution listed the topics "International Agreement re-
lating to regulations, restrictions and discriminations affecting international trade"
and "zEstablishment of an International Trade Organization" in connection with the
agenda of the Conference, the preamble of the Committee's resolution mentioned
them as having been suggested for inclusion in its own agenda.
11. The Article reads in part:
"1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties shall meet from time to time for the
purpose of giving effect to those provisions of this Agreement which involve joint
action and, generally, with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the ob-
jectives of this Agreement. Whenever reference is made in this Agreement to the
Contracting Parties acting jointly they are designated as the CONTRACTING
PARTIES.
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dude the multilateral reductions of trade barriers which are negotiated
at sessions called for that purpose, but cover, in addition to administra-
tive questions, the important function of settling disputes among the
Contracting Parties over compliance with the obligations assumed pur-
suant to the General Agreement. This delimitation of the area within
which legally binding measures may be taken by a majority vote is de-
termined by "common sense." It is only when the Governments con-
cerned have a predictable common interest in complying with previously
agreed rules that such a machinery for joint action will function effec-
tively.
In respect to ratification, the delegates also demonstrated realism in
formulating the General Agreement. The General Agreement was never
ratified.' 2 In fact, none of the original signatories ever submitted in-
struments of acceptance. Instead, the representatives who signed the
General Agreement drew up a "Protocol of Provisional Application."
Their Governments undertook, upon signature of the Protocol on be-
half of all the Governments concerned not later than November 15,
1947, "to apply provisionally on and after January 1, 1948:
(a) Parts I and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,' 3
and
(b) Part II of that Agreement to the fullest extent not inconsistent with
existing legislation."' 4
The provisional and limited applicability of the General Agreement
is strengthened by Article 5 which provides that any Government was
free to withdraw upon sixty days notice. The technique used enabled
the Governments to avoid the usual constitutional requirements, such
as approval by their legislatures, with which the Governments would
have had to comply had they wished to ratify the General Agreement.
Thus, the General Agreement is an agreement among the executive
"3. Each of the Contracting Parties shall be entitled to have one vote at all the
meetings of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
"4. Except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, decisions of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast."
12. Art. XXVI, para. 5, of the General Agreement provided that it "shall enter
into force, as among the Governments which have accepted it, on the thirtieth day
following the day on which instruments of acceptance have been deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations on behalf of governments signatories to the
Final Act the territories of which account for eighty-five per centum of the total ex-
ternal trade .... Annex H attributed the largest shares of the total external trade to
the United Kingdom with 25.7% and to the United States with 25.2%. Each of the
two states was thus able to block the entry into force of the General Agreement.
13. Part I contains a "most-favoured-nation" clause and schedules of multilateral
concessions.
14. Part II contains a set of principles, substantive rules and procedures for con-
ducting trade and for related measures of economic policy.
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branches of certain Governments, a fact distinguishing it from the con-
stitutive documents of international organizations in general and from
the specialized agencies of the United Nations in particular.
The fate of the Havana Charter bears out the realism inherent in the
Protocol of Provisional Application. However, the question may also be
posed whether it was ever intended to have the General Agreement rati-
fied.15 If ratification was never intended, it may be said that the politics
of realism was further accentuated; the commercially stronger powers
would have a more advantageous bargaining position under a provision-
ally applicable protocol than under a ratified General Agreement or un-
der the International Trade Organization as proposed in the Havana
Charter.
The Preparatory Committee reported'( to ECOSOC which resolved to
convene the conference at Havana, Cuba, on November 21, 1947, and to
invite to the conference Member States of the United Nations as well as
the Allied Control Authorities in Germany, Japan, and Korea, and cer-
tain non-member States with "an appreciable interest in world trade."
Only Members of the United Nations were granted voting rights. The
Conference was in session from November 21, 1947, to March 25, 1948.
At the last meeting in plenum the Chairman "declared approved the
text of the Final Act, the text of the Havana Charter, the Resolutions,
and the Reports of the Six Main Committees." 17
The Final Act of the Conference - to which was annexed the text of
the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, a resolu-
tion establishing an Interim Commission of the International Trade
Organization, and the other resolutions of the Conference-was signed
by representatives of the 53 States participating, the representative of
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. A. D. K. Owen, and by
the Executive Secretary of the Conference, Mr. E. Wyndham White.
The binding character of the signatures became a matter of discussion 8
at the closing stage of the Conference. The Final Act states that "the
Conference . . .drew up the Havana Charter for an International Trade
Organization to be submitted to the Governments represented." The
delegate presenting the text to the plenum as elaborated in the commit-
tee concerned, explained that it signified only that the texts of the Char-
ter in English and French were thereby authenticated and that the sig-
15. While some have suggested a negative answer, the rationale that since the
General Agreement was to become effective only after the Havana Conference it
would have little independent significance is not persuasive. It is a mistake to assume
that the Charter and the Agreement were so similar.
16. U.N. Doc. E/469.
17. ECOSOC, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/SR. 21.
18. See U.N. ECOSOC, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/SR.15.
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natories were committed to submit the Charter to their Governments.
The delegate of Bolivia wished to add the following sentence, "The
Delegations of the Countries represented at the Conference . . . ex-
pressly state that the provisions of the Havana Charter are not binding
upon the Countries which they represent, unless they are approved by
their respective Governments and Congresses in accordance with their
present constitutional systems." While the Bolivian proposal was rejected,
the Conference adopted proposals submitted by the delegates of El Sal-
vador and the United States. These proposals were, respectively, that
there be "a full explanation of the Bolivian point of view in the summary
records" and that "a clear explanation" be given by the President of the
Conference "at the time of signature of the Final Act, that such signa-
ture 1) committed the delegations to submit the Charter to their Gov-
ernments, 2) did not commit Governments to submit the Charter to their
parliaments, and 3) did not commit parliaments to ratify the Charter."
Judging from the language of these adopted proposals there seems to
be no doubt that the delegates signing the Final Act did not thereby
bind their Governments to adhere to the Final Act or any of the docu-
ments annexed.
The resolution on the establishment of an Interim Commission for
the International Trade Organization was approved by the Conference
on a roll-call vote.19 It is doubtful that a resolution adopted by a con-
ference of representatives of Governments is, ipso facto, binding upon
their Governments. In the present case, however, it appears that the
question can be answered on the basis of the available evidence con-
cerning the genesis of the resolution.
The Conference established several committees, among which the
Sixth Committee was to consider organizational matters including the
question of establishing an Interim Commission. In a report by the Work-
ing Party concerned 20 it is explained that the Interim Commission was
established by a resolution rather than a draft arrangement to save the
parties from possible legal difficulties. It may be assumed that the "legal
difficulties" invoked by "certain delegations" covered limitations in the
powers vested in them by their Governments. Delegates may not have
been empowered to commit their Governments to an arrangement of a
legally binding character and, thus, could only agree to vote for a resolu-
tion which would not bind their Governments. It appears that even dele-
19. 48 delegates were in favor, 4 abstained, 1 reserved his position and 4 were ab-
sent; ECOSOC Conference on Trade and Employment, 1, E/CONF.2/SR.16, here the
number of countries approving is only 47, but in E/CONF.2/67 Brazil is included to
make 48. Before the Conference adjourned, two of the absentees and one of the ab-
staining also approved the resolution; E/CONF.2/67/Add. I & 2.
20. U.N. ECOSOC, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/I10, March 12, 1948.
1970]Gatt and the UN
gates who might have been competent to do so did not bind their Gov-
ernments by voting for the resolution.
It may be of interest to record the intended relationship among the
three bodies: the General Agreement, the International Trade Organiza-
tion, and the Interim Commission. By Article XXIX of the General
Agreement, the Contracting Parties recognized "that the objectives set
forth in the preamble of this Agreement can best be attained through
the adoption, by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment, of a Charter leading to the creation of an International Trade
Organization." The parties to the Agreement undertook, pending the
acceptance of such a Charter, "to observe to the fullest extent of their
executive authority the general principles of the Draft Charter sub-
mitted to the Conference by the Preparatory Committee." They further
agreed that when the proposed Charter of the International Trade Or-
ganization entered into force, "Article I and Part II of this Agreement
(GATT) shall be suspended and superseded by the corresponding pro-
visions of the Charter." Article I contains the "most-favored-nation"
clause and Part II the agreed procedures, substantive rules and principles
for trade liberalization. The concessions made in Geneva from April to
November, 1947, and at subsequent meetings would remain operative
under the GATT even after the Charter. The provision in Article XXV
for the Contracting Parties acting jointly as the CONTRACTING
PARTIES would also remain, but it was stated that "the Contracting
Parties will also agree concerning the transfer to the International Trade
Organization of their functions under Article XXV.21
The intention to uphold the tariff concessions connected with the
General Agreement seemed particularly appropriate considering Article
17 of the Havana Charter. According to that Article, Members of the
International Trade Organization were to undertake to carry out on the
request of any other Member or Members "negotiations to the sub-
stantial reduction of the general levels of tariffs and other charges . . .
on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis. Non-compliance with
this obligation could -pending a complaint and examination procedure
- lead to a decision by the Organization 22 to allow withdrawal of con-
cessions vis-h-vis the Member violating its obligations. As the negotia-
tions leading to the General Agreement should be deemed to be nego-
tiations pursuant to Article 17,23 the effect would be that Members of
the International Trade Organization which had not been Members of
21. Art. XXIX, para. 2 (b).
22. Presumably, by the organ called the "Conference" in which each Member was
given one vote and which was to reach decisions by a majority vote.
23. Art. 17, para. 3 of the Havana Charter.
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the Preparatory Committee, or who had not later adhered to the General
Agreement, were to be obliged to match the concessions embodied in
the General Agreement. One may wonder if the price for membership
was not in this way set rather high for developing countries which were
not able to derive the same benefits from free trade as could the indus-
trialized nations. For States with centrally planned economies similar
observations may be applicable in spite of the existence of special pro-
visions in the Charter for them.24
The Interim Commission, which came to supply a secretariat for the
Contracting Parties, was clearly intended as a temporary measure.2 5 The
Commission's functions were - with one exception to be discussed be-
low- all temporary in anticipation of the ratification of the Charter of
the International Trade Organization. Finally, it was intended that the
Interim Commission should cease to exist upon the appointment of the
Director General of the International Trade Organization, and that its
property and records should be transferred to the International Trade
Organization at that time.26
The intention that the International Trade Organization should be-
come a specialized agency of the United Nations is also of interest. This
intention was first expressed in the ECOSOC resolution 27 establishing
the Preparatory Committee. Consequently, while the General Agreement
contains no reference to specialized agency status, there is an express pro-
vision in the Havana Charter to this effect. 28 Due to the non-ratification
of the Havana Charter, however, none of the intended developments took
place. The actual development has, in the formal legal sense, been
based on the resolution establishing the Interim Commission, and in
particular on an understanding reached at the Havana Conference con-
cerning the interpretation of paragraph 3 of the annex of that resolution.
According to paragraph 3, the Interim Commission was to elect an Ex-
ecutive Secretary to be its chief administrative officer. He was em-
24. The questions raised concerning the effect of art. 17 are further substantiated
by the proposal in the Draft Charter that a Tariff Committee be established as an
organ of the International Trade Organization. Its functions were to be to initiate the
negotiations and make the decisions called for by art. 17, and the membership were
to be initially the Parties to the General Agreement which were also Members of the
International Trade Organization. Subsequently other Members of the International
Trade Organization, which successfully carried out negotiations pursuant to art. 17,
would become Contracting Parties to the General Agreement and Members of the
Tariff Committee.
25. This was reflected in the constitutive resolution which used the expression:
"Considering that pending the establishment of the Organization certain interim func-
tions should be performed."
26. Annex of the constitutive resolution, para. 9.
27. ECOSOC, Sess. 1/13, operative para. 3 (e).
28. Art. 86, para. 1 of the Havana Charter.
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powered to appoint the staff of the Commission paying due regard to
the recruitment of staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible29 "and
using, as he considers desirable, such assistance as may be extended to
him by the Secretary-General of the United Nations."30 In addition to
the functions mentioned expressly, the Executive Secretary also was to
"perform such other functions and duties as the Commission may de-
termine."
It was this last sentence of paragraph 3 which embodied the result
of an understanding reached at the previously mentioned Working
Party of the Sixth Committee at the Havana Conference.31 The im-
portance of this understanding will become clear in the following section,
which explains how, in fact, the Interim Commission provided a secre-
tariat for the Contracting Parties.
Paragraph 4 of the annex of the resolution on the Interim Commission
is equally relevant. It provided that "the expenses of the Commission
shall be met from funds provided by the United Nations, and, for this
purpose, the Commission shall make the necessary arrangements with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations for the advance of such funds
and for their reimbursement."
These provisions of Paragraphs 3 and 4 afford the authority under
which the co-operation between the Interim Commission and the Con-
tracting Parties has been carried out. The steps by which the provisions
were implemented are as follows:
Soon after the adoption of the resolution on the Interim Commission,
the Commission met and elected 18 Members to the Executive Committee
of the Interim Commission.32
An election procedure paper circulated by the Executive Secretary
contained the observation that "the third State which would qualify
according to the criteria of largest population in the world and potential
importance in international trade would be the Soviet Union." The
paper then continues: "As, however, the Soviet Union is not a member of
29. The language of art. 85, para. 2, of the Charter is nearly identical to that for
the recruitment of U.N. staff. U.N. CHARTER, art. 101, para. 9.
30. The Interim Commission did borrow three officers from the United Nations
Secretariat against reimbursement; see ITO/Interim Commission, DoGs. 1948-1950,4,
ICITO/EC.2/5. The arrangement was terminated at the end of 1948 "in the view of
the considerable period which appears likely to elapse before the convening if the
first ITO Conference and of the limited programme of work." See ITO/Interim Com-
mission, Doc. 1948-1950, ICITO/INF/6.
31. The relevant part of the report reads: "4. It was agreed that under the second
sentence of para. 3 of the annex to the resolution the Executive Secretary of the Com-
mission might for example, be authorized to make available to the Contracting Parties
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade acting jointly in accordance with
art. XXV thereof at their request the services of the staif upon terms to be agreed."
U.N. ECOSOC, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/110.
32. ITO/Interim Commission, Docs. 1948-1950, ICITO/I/SR.1.
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the Interim Commission, it is suggested that only seven places should
be filled by designation . .. and that an additional place should be
filled by election. ... " Thus the Soviet Union's abstention from
participating in the Interim Commission had barred it from direct
influence in the new machinery for trade co-operation as its nonpartici-
pation in the General Agreement barred it from direct influence in the
GATT.
At the same meeting Mr. E. Wyndham White was elected Executive
Secretary of the Interim Commission, and it was agreed "that the
Interim Commission should delegate all its powers to the Executive
Committee including the power to replace the Executive Secretary if
such action should become necessary." 33
A Working Party of the Executive Committee proposed that the
Executive Secretary be authorized to employ up to nineteen persons in
the Secretariat of the Interim Commission and to gradually move the
seat from Lake Success to Geneva. This proposal was adopted.
In his report 34 to the second session of the Executive Committee, the
Executive Secretary stated how he had proceeded with the recruitment of
a staff.35 Concerning financing, the report stated that after the Executive
Secretary had applied to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for
an advance for the second quarter of 1948,36 "the Secretary-General...
agreed to this advance subject to an undertaking for the reimbursement
of this and all subsequent advances by the ITO when established." The
Executive Secretary in reply referred to paragraph 4 of the Commission's
terms of reference and expressed confidence that the Commission would
accept the position that any advances to the Commission should be reim-
bursed to the United Nations by the ITO37
To complete the account of this first phase of the relationship between
the Interim Commission and the Contracting Parties, only Chapter III
of the Executive Secretary's report remains to be mentioned.
33. U.N. ECOSOC, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/73.
34. ITO/Interim Commission. Does. 1948-1950, ICITO/EC.2/5.
35. Some positions were borrowed from United Nations Secretariat. This was done to
carry out work for the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity
Arrangements, - a subsidiary organ of ECOSOC, see note 30 supra. The Executive
Secretary of the Interim Commission had also become Executive Secretary of the
General Agreement.
36. The Secretary-General had covered the expenses of the Preparatory Committee,
the Havana Conference and the Interim Commission by making advances out of the
Working Capital Fund.
37. ITO/Interim Commission, Does. 1948-1950, ICITO/EC.2/5. The commitment
made by the Executive Secretary was clearly within the terms of reference of the
Interim Commission. Para. 4 of the annex provided that "the expenses of the Commis-
sion shall be met from funds provided by the United Nations and for this purpose the
Commission shall make the necessary arrangements with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations for the advance of such Funds and for their reimbursement."
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Chapter III reads as follows:
At the First Session of the Contracting Parties, in Havana, it was
agreed, as a provisional arrangement, to request the Executive Secre-
tary to provide secretariat services to the Contracting Parties to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In consequence the Secre-
tariat has been handling the day to day administrative work arising out
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as well as preparing
for the Second Session of the Contracting Parties .... In the view of
the Executive Secretary, any work done by the Secretariat in relation
to the GATT may properly be regarded as within the general authority
contained in paragraph 2 (i) of the terms of reference of the Com-
mission. Accordingly, no claims should be made on the Contracting
Parties for payment for services rendered by the Secretariat of the
Commission.
This part of the report of the Executive Secretary was approved by the
Executive Committee at its second session.38
Since it appears that the resolution establishing the Interim Com-
mission was not binding on 39 the Governments whose representatives
voted for it, the Executive Committee, consisting of duly empowered
representatives of the Member-Governments, was apparently entirely
free to reach the decision to provide the services of its Secretariat to the
Contracting Parties free of charge.
Rule 15 of the rules of procedure for sessions of the Contracting
Parties may offer a clarification of the issue. Rule 15 provides that "the
usual duties of the Secretariat shall, by agreement with the Interim
Commission for the International Trade Organization, be performed by
the Executive Secretary of the Interim Commission on a reimbursable
basis.40
Hence, based on a series of agreements among representatives of
Governments an arrangement was arrived at, whereby the United
Nations advanced funds to the Interim Commission to cover the expenses
of the Secretariat of the Commission. The Members of the Interim Com-
mission reimbursed the United Nations, and the Executive Committee of
the Interim Commission agreed to extend the services of the Secretariat
to the Contracting Parties who, in turn, accepted these services and
agreed to reimburse the Interim Commission.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations co-operated in the
arrangement in the anticipation -at the outset, at least -of the early
establishment of the International Trade Organization as a specialized
38. ITO/Interim Commission, Docs. 1948-1950, ICITO/EC.2/SR.3.
39. See p. 65 supra.
40. Press-Release of U.S. Department of State, December 6, 1950, 23 DEP'T STATE
BuLL. 977 (1950).
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agency of the United Nations. When it became clear that the Havana
Charter would not be ratified in the foreseeable future an initiative4'
was taken at the Sixth Session of the Contracting Parties to find a more
formal and permanent arrangement. But it appears from the documen-
tation made available by GATT that the initiative was frustrated and
that no change has occurred in the arrangement established in the
period 1948-1950. From United Nations records, it can be seen that
there has been a close working relationship between the Interim Com-
mission Secretariat and sections of the United Nations Secretariat,
especially to prevent the overlapping of work. This co-ordination has
been carried out primarily through the Administrative Committee on
Co-ordination,42 in which the Executive Secretary participates as an
observer. Invitations to send observers to each other's meetings have
been exchanged between the United Nations (Department of Social and
Economic Affairs) and the Interim Commission. The staff of the In-
terim Commission Secretariat participates in the United Nations Joint
Staff Pension Fund and their employment is regulated in accordance
with the Staff Regulations of the United Nations Secretariat.
III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. THE INTERIM COMMISSION
To determine the legal status of the Interim Commission, it may be
expedient first to analyze the facts surrounding the establishment and
early activity of the Commission. Concerning this first phase, certain
arguments may be advanced indicating a close relationship with the
United Nations. It may thus be mentioned that 1) the Interim Com-
mission was established at a conference called and financed by the
United Nations; 2) it was intended as an interim body for the Inter-
national Trade Organization which was in turn intended as a specialized
agency of the United Nations; and 3) the United Nations provides the
funds to cover the expenses of the Commission.
On the other hand there are circumstances suggesting the independent
character of the Interim Commission. It may thus be maintained that
1) the debate at the Conference on whether the Havana Charter was
binding on the represented Governments was a debate concerned with
the powers of the delegates as representatives of their Governments and
41. See SEYID MuffAmsaAD: TnE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF WoRLD TRADE 95-97 (1958).
42. Advisory organ to ECOSOC to which it submits annual reports. Members are
the administrative chiefs of the international organizations within the "United Nations
family." The Secretary-General of the United Nations is permanent chairman.
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not as members of a United Nations organ; 2) both Members and non-
members of the United Nations participated in the conference; 3) the
Interim Commission from the outset had an independent source of
finance evidenced by the pledge to fully reimburse the United Nations;
4) the Executive Secretary of the Interim Commission was at the same
time Executive Secretary of the General Agreement; and 5) the Interim
Commission Secretariat came gradually to carry out more work for the
Contracting Parties to the General Agreement after having completed
its interim functions.
Considering these arguments it appears that the Interim Commission
was not established as an organ of the United Nations, but was set up as
an independent body. After it became apparent that the Havana Charter
was not going to be ratified, the original purpose of the Interim Com-
mission was abandoned and replaced by that of obtaining a mutually
advantageous agreement by establishing close working relations with the
Contracting Parties to the General Agreement. Considering this change
from the first to the second phase, it appears that the Interim Commis-
sion became even further removed from the United Nations.
The relationship between the Interim Commission and the General
Agreement soon became a very close one in view of the fact that 1) the
Interim Commission Secretariat came gradually, and at least from
January 1, 1951 to work exclusively for the Contracting Parties; 2) the
Executive Secretary of the Interim Commission since 1948 has also been
the Executive Secretary of the General Agreement; 3) the Interim
Commission or its Executive Committee apparently did not meet after
having held an emergency session in July 1949;43 and 4) the Contracting
Parties de facto exercised full authority over the Secretariat as if it were
a secretariat employed and financed directly by them.
Nevertheless, it must still be recognized that the Interim Com-
mission was established as a body that was separate from the General
Agreement, and that the Contracting Parties have since 1952 reimbursed
the United Nations through the Interim Commission upholding the
original distinction.
Therefore, it appears that the Interim Commission still exists de
jure. While de facto it has ceased to function, thereby lending persuasion
to the impression that the Secretariat is that of the Contracting Parties,
43. The Chairman of the Executive Committee "summarized the various opinions
and pointed out that since they were largely personal opinions, nothing final could be
decided as yet. There was general agreement to postpone the date of the next meeting
of the Executive Committee and that whatever new date was decided upon [it] should
be shortly before entry into effect of the Charter so that there would be time to
prepare an up-to-date report." Emergency Session of the Executive Committee in
Annex, July 1949. See ITO/Interim Commission, Docs. 1948-1950, ICITO/1/18 af 6.
Cornell International Law Journal/Vol. 3, No. 1
it still possesses the two de jure functions of being the employer of the
Secretariat's staff and of receiving and transmitting to the United Nations
the reimbursement from the Contracting Parties.
B. RELATIONSHIP BETVEEN THE GENERAL AGREEMENT
AND THE UNITED NATIONS
Finally, concerning the relationship between the General Agreement
and the United Nations, there is no doubt that the General Agreement
is not a specialized agency. This follows from the one fact that no
agreement to this effect has been concluded with the Economic and
Social Council as required by Articles 57 and 63 of the United Nations
Charter. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether such an agreement could
be concluded, since the General Agreement per se probably is not, in
the meaning of Article 57, a "specialized agency, established by inter-
governmental agreement." This follows from its character of being
only a provisionally applicable agreement among the executive branches
of certain governments. 44
Attempting to further define the relationship, there are certain
grounds indicating that the General Agreement is closely related to the
United Nations.
In support of this view, it may be maintained that 1) the General
Agreement was negotiated and concluded by the Members of the Pre-
paratory Committee; 2) the preamble to the General Agreement states
this was, "in accordance with the Resolutions adopted at the first session
of the Preparatory Committee;" 3) it was intended that essential parts of
the General Agreement should be replaced by the Charter for the Inter-
national Trade Organization upon ratification of the Charter; 4) the
United Nations provides the funds for the secretariat working for the
Contracting Parties; and 5) there has been a certain measure of co-
operation and co-ordination largely carried out through the Advisory
Committee on Co-ordination, such as (a) mutual representation in
meetings, (b) application of the United Nations staff regulations to the
staff of the Interim Commissin Secretariat, and (c) participation by
the Interim Commission Secretariat's staff in the United Nations Joint
Staff Pension Fund.
While not denying the validity of these arguments, it should be re-
called that there are important reasons for considering the General
Agreement to be a separate body independent of the United Nations. It
may be maintained that 1) the Members of the Preparatory Committee
acted outside their mandate from the Economic and Social Council
44. See pp. 66-67 supra.
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when they negotiated and concluded the General Agreement; 2) the text
of the General Agreement envisions ratification, thus indicating that
it is not a subordinate organ of the United Nations because in the
latter case ratification would not be called for; 3) the mutual represen-
tation at meetings - including those of the Advisory Committee on
Co-ordination - is only on the level of observers with speaking but
not voting rights; 4) the Contracting Parties do not submit regular,
periodic reports on their activities to the Economic and Social Council,
as do the specialized agencies; and 5) the Contracting Parties fully
reimburse the United Nations through the Interim Commission.
Taking into account the arguments for and against assuming a close
relationship between the United Nations and the General Agreement,
it appears that despite cooperation in practical matters, the General
Agreement was established as, and has remained, a body separate from
the United Nations and not subject to directions from the United
Nations.
In effect, the General Agreement came to function as an international
organization with its own secretariat. It is this complex that comes to
mind when reference is made to "GATT". Barring formal, legal criteria,
it seems natural to refer to "GATT" as if it were an international
organization. As has been seen, the conclusions to be drawn on the legal
aspects do not allow for a description of GATT as an entity. Here then
is an example of the limits posed by the methods of the lawyer and the
political scientist.
The realization that GATT worked so well very likely was a principal
reason why the United States Government decided not to resubmit the
Havana Charter for ratification. The decision was made public on
December 6, 1950.4 5 Prior to that, the State Department Bulletin had
contained a very approving evaluation of the achievement of GATT.
46
One encouraging fact was that 32 Governments had now become Con-
tracting Parties to the General Agreement, and 7 more were expected
to join. Thus, from the point of view of the United States Government,
there was great satisfaction with GATT.
Another principal reason for not asking for ratification may have been
that business groups had taken a very unfavorable view of the proposed
International Trade Organization. It was feared both for its anti-
protectionist and its internationalist features and also for its concessions
to the concept of overall direction of international trade. There was much
less opposition to GATT which was attacked mainly on protectionist
45. See note 43 supra.
46. Sinn, Fourth Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 23 DEP'T STATE BULL. 150, 153 (1950).
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grounds.47 The GATT arrangement did not require ratification, and
it would have been very difficult to obtain ratification of the Havana
Charter.48
Along with these reasons came the change in the international situ-
ation; by 1950 the Cold War was no longer only latent. West-Germany
had become a party to the General Agreement, and a special agreement
was under preparation to include Japan among the GATT group. The
situation did not seem to require the establishment of a specialized
agency of the United Nations. A less internationalist path, based more
on political and less on legal concepts, was chosen.
47. Diebold, The End of the I.TO., in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, No. 16
(1952).
48. The only countries which had ratified were Liberia and Australia. The Australian
ratification was conditional upon similar action by the United States and the United
Kingdom.
